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Banking intermediaries help to coordinate different agents’ plans, reducing the
uncertainty that might otherwise hamper transactions because of disruptive “lemon”
problems. By establishing trust relationships based on private information, banks
allow risk pooling and provide insurance to different classes of agents, act as mar-
ket makers, and provide services that save transaction and notary costs. “Lemon”
problems are also important to understand the difference between market pricing of
the risk of bonds and the banks’ pricing of the risk of loans. In the ﬁrst case risk is
priced on the basis of freely available information, relying heavily on the informa-
tional content of statistical time series. The resulting equilibria, though, are fragile,
because they are subject to abrupt regime changes as new information becomes pub-
lic. Banks, on the contrary, price loans on the basis of their private information, and
they can thus provide insurance against different kinds of shocks. Given the opacity
of their activities, and the huge externalities that their entrepreneurial choices imply,
banks must be subject to an extensive regulation, imposing a transparent disclosure
of their risk taking activities.
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11 Introduction
The importance of uncertainty for a theory of the banking ﬁrm has somewhat being
neglected. Modern theories of banking have in fact focused mainly on the analysis of in-
formation asymmetries and their role in shaping optimal contractual solutions, such as the
debt contract, or the demand deposit contract. This paper suggests that the role of bank-
ing intermediation can be better understood on the basis of Malmgrem (1961) intuition
that ﬁrms help to coordinate the plans of different individuals. The basic intuition is that
banking intermediaries help to coordinate different agents’ plans, reducing the uncertainty
that might otherwise hamper transactions. The limited knowledge of other agents’ plans
may, in fact, often generate disruptive “lemon” problems. Banks build trust relationships
that not only permit to trade in absence of regulation and enforcement organizations, but
often generate equilibria that are more efﬁcient than those of an uncoordinated market.
Trust allows banks to pool risks providing insurance to different classes of agents, to act
as market makers allowing the exploitation of trade opportunities, and to provide services
that save transaction and notary costs.
The paper is organized in two sections. The ﬁrst is focused on the role of uncertainty
for a theory of ﬁnancial intermediation and the banking ﬁrm. In the ﬁrst part of the sec-
tion I discuss the beneﬁt of ﬁnancial intermediation in presence of uncertainty and costly
information. The rest of the section analyzes the different services that banks provide,
suggesting that the solutions banks develop to reduce the uncertainty individual agents
face, generate economies of scope in the provision of different banking services. The
ﬁnal part of the section discusses why banks beneﬁt from being organized as ﬁrms.
The second section draws some implications for the banking industry. In particular, it
seems interesting to analyze the role of information and uncertainty in the bonds and loans
market, respectively. My thesis is that the ubiquity of “lemon” problems is important to
understand the difference between market pricing of the risk of bonds and the banks’ pric-
ing of the risk of loans. In the ﬁrst case the market prices the risk on the basis of freely
available information, and there is a simple, possibly linear relationship, as in the case of
the CAPM model, between risk and its market price. But this relationship is fragile be-
causeitissubjecttoabruptregimechangesasnewinformationbecomespublic. Banks, on
the contrary, price loans on the basis of their past investment in information gathering ac-
tivities. Banks can thus price risk in a fairly reliable way, maintaining relatively stable and
predictable pricing policies, but their default costs must be convex, limiting the amount
of risk they can take. The following parts of the section focus on how competitive forces
operate in presence of uncertainty and information costs. The thesis is that the efﬁciency
of the industry largely depends on the capability of banks to price discriminate. Gather-
ing information banks can price risks individually, reducing rationing. Credit rationing,
therefore, measures the potential for further development of ﬁnancial intermediation.
In the concluding section I then discuss some implications for the regulatory frame-
work of the industry. Given the opacity of their activities, and the huge externalities that
their entrepreneurial choices imply, banks must be subject to an extensive regulation. In
particular, regulation should aim to impose the disclosure of the risk taking activities en-
tertained, by imposing tight accounting standards. Moreover, the lender of last resort
should substitute depositors in forcing bankruptcy procedures, rather than bail out insol-
vent banks. These procedures, therefore, should be designed in order to preserve the
2continuation of the activity, whenever viable.
2 Uncertainty and the role of banking intermediaries
2.1 Information and intermediation
Marketpricesconveyinformationregardingtherelativescarcityofdifferentresources.
Agents can plan their action, continuously revising their expectations as the actions of
other agents change the environment, because market prices reﬂect these innovations
(Hayek (1937, 1945b)). Coordination of plans can thus be achieved because the observ-
able variations of prices avoid a large number of transactions. The speed and efﬁciency
of the process depend on the success of the price system in reﬂecting, quickly and trans-
parently, the new conditions.1 Institutions such as organized markets make price systems
more efﬁcient and the availability of price information cheaper.
Prices are an efﬁcient device to transfer information regarding goods whose proper-
ties are well known, so that they represent ideal standards that can be used as a reference
point for whole sets of other goods. When more complex goods or services are traded,
any contractual agreement must contain provisions covering aspects of the transaction
different from the price. Whenever the transaction requires time to be completed, many
possibly relevant factors cannot be contemplated ex ante, and contracts cannot cover all
different possible outcomes. Coordination of different plans becomes increasingly dif-
ﬁcult because of uncertainty. In general, every action or market transaction entertained
by a single individual affects, more or less relevantly, all other members of the commu-
nity (Knight (1923)). The deﬁnition of property rights permits single individual agents to
cooperate by deﬁning what kind of external effect of their activity must be tolerated by
other members. However, the deﬁnition of a set of property rights and the existence of a
mean of payment are not sufﬁcient to permit the cooperation of different agents in these
more complicated instances. A new set of rules and institutions is required to transfer and
use the knowledge of different individuals. To conduct certain complex transactions, as
those regarding industrial productions, or long-distance trade, it is necessary to coordi-
nate different agents in order to reduce the costs caused by unpredictable events. These
agents, possessing different resources and knowledge, must cooperate for a long period of
time. And they must commit their resources, because a case by case involvement requir-
ing several different interactions over time may produce too much uncertainty, making
cooperation impossible. Individual contracts, necessarily incomplete, must be supported
by implicit or explicit sets of rules, embedded in behavioral routines, such as traditional
trade codes, or in speciﬁc organized institutions such as ﬁrms. As these institution evolve,
some agents can develop a specialized knowledge, useful to put together the resources of
different agents, by acting as intermediaries.
When individual characteristics of the contracting agents remain fundamental, and
transaction cannot take place by means of standardized, anonymous transactions, prices
provide noisy signals. In the exchange of durable goods, or ﬁnancial contracts, to provide
a simple example, the expected future price is a relevant factor for today’s choice of enter-
ing the transaction. In order to formulate an expectation regarding the future price, agents
1In general equilibrium models, prices rather than quantities must adjust for the equilibrium to be stable.
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their entrepreneurial capability, if they produce or supply the goods, or their preferences,
if they demand the goods. Each agent formulates the expectations on the basis of his own
subjective, limited information. This implies, even under the (counterfactual) simplify-
ing assumption that every individual uses the same logical models to analyze the reality,
that every expectation regarding the choices of others is made with an error. Agents can
(eventually) attribute probability distributions to the capabilities and preferences of oth-
ers. Moreover, every agent knows that the expected future price, be it an actual price in a
future market, or an individual conjecture, is affected by the different forecasting errors.
Even if each of the forecasting errors is zero on average, the variance of the expected
future price depends on the number of errors made, and consequently, on the number of
agents whose choices are to be forecasted.
In our simple example where agents need to formulate an expectation for price of a
good only, what we are showing is that the forecasting error of prices is ultimately due to
lack of information, and uncertainty regarding individual characteristics. A crucial point
is that the presence of many agents does not reduce the price variance, it rather increases
it. Diversiﬁcation does not work because prices depend on many non linear transforma-
tions of individual characteristics. These individual characteristics are not independent,
since agents interact, cooperate and learn from each other. The interaction of different
individual errors increases the dimension of the uncertainty, so that even if errors are not
perfectly correlated, and thus on aggregate the impact of individual errors may be reduced
by diversiﬁcation, as the number of agents involved grows, a higher number of agents
implies a larger number of variance factors. Whenever errors are not independent across
different time periods, the second effect always dominates.
This basic consideration has a direct implication. Akerlof (1970) has shown that the
likelihood of the emergence of a “lemon” problem crucially depends on the second mo-
ment of the probability distribution of the subjective evaluation of the quality of the goods.
As possible outcomes increasingly diverge, a “lemon” problem becomes more likely. In
the example of a durable good, the future price of the good plays the same role as the
quality of the car in the example of the market for used cars. Clearly, as the number of
agents involved grows, the likelihood that the transaction will not take place rises. In
many cases the problem may be reduced by collecting information and modelling an ag-
gregate variable, for example estimating a demand function. But aggregate models rely
on assumptions regarding the stability of some basic relationships among the observable
variables. And these relationships may change when some new factors change the basic
underlying fundamentals, such as individual preferences, or put in question the reliability
of the relevant information. In such instances a “lemon” problem may emerge abruptly
and a well established market may suddenly collapse, as a consequence of rational behav-
ior on part of the agents.
The presence of intermediary agents can play an important role, drastically reducing
the number of errors, and, consequently, reducing the variance of the expected future
price. If buyers make use of a broker, communicating the relevant information to the
intermediary, or if the intermediary acts on behalf of both classes of agents, the number
of expectation errors falls. The beneﬁts are relevant even if the numbers are not large,
because strategic interactions may generate the same kind of problems, since every agent
must forecast the expectation regarding the expectations of every one else, and so on, to
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information disclosure between the intermediary and his customers and the agency cost
due to the information asymmetry between them. In many circumstances the beneﬁts pre-
vail. Bankers are intermediaries that simultaneously act as brokers for some classes of
agents and selling agents for others, providing multiple services to each of them. Their
fundamental role is to gather private information by means of direct personal contacts,
in order to provide services that require speciﬁc knowledge and mutual trust. They help
to coordinate agents by trading trust, reducing the need for explicit rules of conduct and
enforcement procedures. “Good will has ... a rationale based on economic costs” (Malm-
grem (1961) p. 414).
2.1.1 Transaction services
When some particular goods are used as means of payments, transactions are both
expensive and risky. Storing these goods in safe vaults, payments can be processed by
transferring just the title of ownership of the goods by means of bookkeeping entries.
Bankers provide these services, allowing to settle transactions among agents physically
distant from the intermediary and among them, by using letters of credit, bank notes, or
checks. The diffusion of these important instruments is based on the reputation of the
banker and on a waterproof relationship of trust between the banker and the customers.
Letters of credit, bank notes, and checks are in fact accepted only because the interme-
diary is trusted, by personal knowledge or through his reputation, since the holders of
the notes can hardly monitor the reserves of the bank. Agents who had large amounts
of wealth at their disposal, possessed the storing facilities, and, more importantly, had
a solid reputation, became the ﬁrst bankers. During the early medieval age they were
mainly goldsmiths, money changers and successful merchants.
Trade requires heavy transaction costs in order to ascertain not only the quality of the
goods exchanged and the value of the medium of exchange, but even to prove that the
parties are the legitimate owners of the goods traded and that the transaction is freely and
deliberately undertaken. Banking intermediaries reduce these cost noteworthy, because
their bookkeeping entries track every step of any transaction. In practice, banks furnish
an implicit guarantee that the payment process has been proper. In this regard medieval
money changers acted no differently from modern organized markets where all transac-
tions are settled at the end of the day. They are market makers, providing a guarantee for
the correctness and propriety of the transaction. The services that bankers furnish avoid
an enormous amount of duplication of information acquisition. These do not normally
extend to a full guarantee of the transaction, because the provision of this insurance ser-
vice would be extremely expensive, since the acquisition of information would need to
be more extensive. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for banks to back some speciﬁc large
transactions of important customers.
In principle, the provision of payment services could be accomplished storing the
money received in safe vaults and charging customers fees to cover the costs and earn a
proﬁt, keeping in the form of reserves the whole amount of gold received. But since the
early age of banking only a fraction of the amount received has been kept as reserve. It
was soon realized that guaranteeing the performance of the transactions services required
holding as reserves only a fraction of the amounts of money received. The obvious so-
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created difﬁcult problems in ages of poor deﬁnition of property rights, difﬁcult enforce-
ment of the law, and arbitrary conﬁscation on part of the political power. In these condi-
tions storing large amounts of money carried a large risk, which increased the willingness
to bear the credit risk (Rajan (1998)). Dominating the technology for the provision of
depository services, bankers could cheaply provide payment services. They became ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries too, because lending provided further revenues without seriously
increasing the risk of deposits (Kashyap et al. (2002)).
2.1.2 Financial intermediation
Agents wishing to save part of their wealth in order to increase future consumption,
often do not have access to valuable investment projects. Conversely, agents who can
undertake proﬁtable investments do not always own all the necessary resources. Trade
between these two sets of agents would clearly be beneﬁcial, because one set of agents
has the resources, the other the knowledge, and investment requires both. But trade can-
not in this case occur through a standard transaction, direct or indirect. Knowledge is, in
fact, made up of information and the capacity to make use of the information. Both are
very difﬁcult to trade, because they are either non transferable or public goods, at least
partially. Gains from trade can be exploited only if savers accept to transfer resources
to the investors, in exchange for a promise to share future beneﬁts of the investments.
But the asymmetric availability of information, makes transactions of this type special.
Investors in fact require time to fulﬁl their part of the transaction, because they have
to complete the investment project to be able to keep the promise. In these conditions,
standardized risk-sharing contracts generate severe adverse selection problems. And even
when the contracts are individually tailor-made, moral hazard problems, due to the ex post
emergence of information asymmetries, cannot be easily avoided. Repeated, anonymous
transactions cannot take place. This generates a large potential market for technologies
and techniques that could reduce the cost of information. Market forces create incentives
for the development of several sorts of special incentive-compatible contracts and self-
selection mechanisms, in order to overcome the “lemon” problem. Property rights may
be reallocated by means of specially designed contracts, in order to create incentives to
disclose the relevant information. The standard debt contract, transferring the ownership
of the investment project to the creditor when part of the obligations are not fulﬁlled, is
just the main example. Debt contracts are effective because they fully transfer the infor-
mation costs to the borrower, who can undertake the investment whenever the expected
returns are large enough to cover these extra costs. These contractual solutions though
are very expensive devices, because they require a complex system of rules, laws, and
organizations to protect the property rights they deﬁne. This generates large transaction
costs, for both the deﬁnition and the enforcement of the contracts (Coase (1937, 1960)).
In the absence of a highly developed legal system, and a very efﬁcient organization
guaranteeing the enforcement of the law, complex transaction involving time lags cannot
take place. Moreover, even in presence of sophisticated contractual agreements, a large
demand for ﬁnancing remain unsatisﬁed and proﬁtable investment projects may not be un-
dertaken in the absence of intermediaries that can reduce the asymmetry in the availability
of information. Intermediaries, in fact, drastically reduce transaction costs by pooling the
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multiplicity of costs that individual savers should bear to get informed (Diamond (1984)).
This outcome can be achieved in presence of a relationship of mutual trust between the
banker and both classes of customers. The value of the franchise of either a medieval
money changer or any contemporary bank lies with the reputation and the network of re-
lationships with the customers. A bank in fact needs to perform the same kind of activity
in order to issue loans or service deposits: it must obtain information and build trust. Once
these relationships are in place, they can be used to service deposits or to extend credit.
To a certain extent, the difference between the provision of payment services or of ﬁnan-
cial intermediation is almost immaterial. To settle transactions by means of bookkeeping
entries, as a matter of fact, credit and debt relationships are entertained, if only for a short
lapse of time. So the difference lies with the length of the credit relationship.
2.1.3 Liquidity provision
In a poorly developed economic system, individual agents must store some goods,
in order to have some precautionary savings, to face adverse contingencies of different
kinds. When agents cooperate through an intense network of exchanges, the need for pre-
cautionary savings can be reduced by developing instruments for mutual insurance, useful
as long as the negative shocks envisaged do not affect every agent simultaneously and to
the same effect. On the other hand, the network of economic relationships makes every
agent dependent on each other, generating risks of a different nature: agents must cope
with contingencies depending on the individual choices of their neighbors. In a developed
economy, precautionary savings are necessary, in particular, to face unexpected variations
of market prices. They stem from the impossibility to perfectly coordinate economic be-
havior, because of the difﬁculty to forecast correctly other individual’s choices.
The demand for the services of an intermediary agent between savers and investors is
due to the need to match the different aims of different agents. Savers are risk-averse and
subject to shocks to both their income and their consumption needs, consequently they
need to hold a relevant fraction of their wealth in a liquid form, in order to always be able
to smooth consumption even when facing negative shocks. Investment projects require
time to be completed and to generate proﬁts. The resources allocated to ﬁnance risky
investment projects are therefore illiquid. For this reason, risk-averse agents can ﬁnance
these projects to a limited extent only, making use of the savings in excess of the liquid
reserves they need. But whenever liquidity shocks are not perfectly correlated, if savers
could pool their savings, the need for reserves would be reduced noteworthy. Borrow-
ing by means of demand deposits, banks allow savers to ﬁnance productive investments,
while holding the liquid reserves they need to smooth consumption (Diamond and Dybvig
(1983)). Establishing a relationship of mutual trust with the intermediary, depositors can
pool their precautionary savings, minimizing their amount.
In a similar way, an important part of lending activities is the provision of liquidity
on demand. Bank lending is in fact, to a large extent, based on commitment credit. Pre-
deﬁned amounts of money are kept at the disposal of a borrower that can use the line of
credit at his request. A crucial aspect of the activity is the need to hold idle reserves of the
means of payment or other assets that can easily be liquidated. Unless the liquidity needs
of consumers and ﬁrms are perfectly correlated, the cost of reserves is lower by jointly
7managing the liquidity of different classes of agents. Indeed, in many circumstances the
correlation may be negative, for example because of seasonal patterns of consumption.
In this case the overall variance of the liquidity needs of the system is much lower, con-
sequently a lower amount of idle reserves is necessary (Kashyap et al. (2002)). Bank
reserves are a cost that must be borne because individual agents have different, and some-
times mutually incompatible, expectations. Reserves play the same role as precautionary
savings, but they are a much more efﬁcient device. By means of their intermediation,
bankers build impersonal and anonymous trust relationships among a multiplicity of dif-
ferent agents. Bankers coordinate different agents’ responses to shocks, making them
mutually compatible, whenever possible. The outcome achieved is very efﬁcient, but the
system can be fragile. When an adverse shock affects every member of the economic sys-
tem, no insurance scheme is viable. More importantly, intermediaries cannot coordinate
the reactions of different agents, because all agents move in the same direction. When-
ever agents cannot discern the general and systemic nature of the shock, the relationship
of trust may be put in question. In these instances they cannot discriminate the intrinsic
limits of the system from a collapse of the relationship of mutual trust.
2.1.4 Relationship lending
The success of most entrepreneurial projects is based on some speciﬁc knowledge of
market conditions. Information regarding the conditions of a particular market, in a par-
ticular place, in a particular moment (Hayek (1945a)). The knowledge of these particular
circumstances of place and time, together with the command of skills that are often based
on tacit knowledge,2 form most of the intangible capital of the borrower. Creditors as-
sume a relevant part of the risk of an investment, and their entrepreneurial function is the
analysis and selection of risks. In many circumstances, the problem of the lender is to
evaluate the intangible capital, that cannot be collateralized, and often is the main asset of
the borrower.3 Whenever the intangible capital is large in relation to the tangible assets of
the borrower, relationship lending is the only available external source of ﬁnance. Bearing
the costs of the establishment of a personal direct relationship, lenders can extend short-
term credit and ﬁnance projects that would be unproﬁtable for other investors. By means
of a consolidated personal relationship, they can obtain particular knowledge regarding
almost every aspect of the entrepreneurial activity of the borrowers. This “inside lending”
provides a comparative advantage with respect to any other form of ”outside” debt (Fama
(1985)). As “inside” lenders it is possible to evaluate the investment projects, and even
more importantly, the reliability of the borrower. Moreover, a long term relationship may
reduce the impact of moral hazard problems because the capability of the intermediary to
obtain and process the relevant knowledge grows as the relationship takes place and goes
on. Developing a deeper understanding of the speciﬁc aspects of the market, in fact, the
lender can get a higher return in case of default, and this reduces the potential incentives
for the borrower to strategically default.
2Information and skills that are embedded in the particular traditions, rules of conduct and capacity of
single individuals, and are not transferable because they are strictly subjective.
3“Not all the knowledge of the ever changing particular facts that man continually uses lends itself to
organization or systematic exposition; much of it exists only dispersed among countless individuals. The
same applies to that important part of expert knowledge which is not substantive knowledge but merely
knowledge of where and how to ﬁnd the needed information.” (Hayek (1960) p. 25).
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obtain ﬁnance and persuade the lender that returns of the projects are appropriate. It is
a very costly process, with a small chance of success, and in many cases very difﬁcult
to replicate with other potential lenders. In this instance, borrowers face relevant search
costs. In order to maximize the return of the investment in the relationship, the lender may
impose different kinds of switch costs, locking the borrower up (Klemperer (1995)). The
most natural strategy followed is to provide a wide range of services that would imply
the duplication of search costs if provided separately. In particular, banking intermedi-
aries impose to the borrower the choice of the intermediary for the management of his
payments. Furthermore, by managing the transactions, bankers can monitor the liquidity
of the borrower, obtaining most of the fundamental information they need regarding the
business.4 The cash-ﬂow of the ﬁrm conveys information regarding the health of the ﬁrm
in real time, and its volatility measures the impact of shocks that affect the business. To
achieve this aim they often extend credit at favorable terms to the best customers (the
“prime” rate) passing them some of the proﬁts they make from the fees and commissions
of the transactions (Hodgman (1961)). Or alternatively they pay them a higher interest
rate on deposits, or they charge lower fees, in order to consolidate a long-term relation-
ship. When the payment of interests on deposits was forbidden, banks simply compelled
borrowers to hold as a deposit a fraction of the loan or credit facility issued, through the
compensating balance requirements (Sprenkle (1969, 1972)). Banks can in this way re-
duce competitive pressures, making it too costly for borrowers to turn to competitors for
the management of their payments.5 Bank customers pay the trust relationship by being
charged monopolistic prices.
Apparently relationship lending does not require the existence of an agent who acts
as an intermediary between savers and investors. It is necessary to ask why the analysis
of the inside information that lenders must perform cannot be done by the ﬁnal providers
of ﬁnance, savers in general. If returns on investment projects were independent and
identically distributed, and transaction costs irrelevant, savers who were willing to rent
their resources to potential investors could eliminate all risks through diversiﬁcation. But
returns are correlated, and knowledge is costly to acquire. And since knowledge is in
many regards a public good, devices to keep it private are very expensive, and make
transaction costs relevant. It is difﬁcult to obtain the relevant information, and difﬁcult
to trade it.6 A specialized intermediary can achieve economies of scale in the selection
and analysis of information and investment projects, avoiding duplication, by collecting
the relevant information and selling it to different agents, including the less wealthy. It
follows that individual lenders have a strong incentive to jointly delegate the function
of monitoring to an intermediary, in order to avoid duplication. Delegation, however,
raises the problem of the control of the intermediary on part of the lenders. When the
intermediaryhaslimitedliability, theproblemistocontroltheriskthathetakeson, thereis
a delegation cost. The possibility for the intermediary to diversify the portfolio, ﬁnancing
4Vale (1993) assumes that by managing payments banks acquire information regarding the risk attitude
of customers.
5The requirement of this implicit payment explains, according to Sprenkle (1969), the apparently irra-
tional amount of deposits that ﬁrms normally hold.
6Wealthy agents have a great advantage, but they face a higher opportunity cost, because of the high
value of their leisure.
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2.2 The banking ﬁrm
Loans can be provided by individual agents. But information regarding a speciﬁc
credit contract is often to a large extent both a ﬁxed and a sunk cost, so it is in most
instances impossible to diversify the portfolio by simply reducing the size of the single
loan. Diversiﬁcation is important in ﬁnancial intermediation, because the lower the risk
of the portfolio, the lower the agency costs that the presence of an intermediary generates.
When the ﬁnancial intermediation services are provided by individual agents, they often
do not possess the information required to diversify the portfolio to the extent necessary
to make the intermediation viable. In other words, the importance of diversiﬁcation for an
efﬁcient intermediation generates relevant economies of scale. Consequently, most of the
times ﬁnancial intermediation requires that different individuals pool their information
and coordinate their activity. Banking becomes a team activity where it is difﬁcult to
evaluate the marginal contribution of each individual; banks must be ﬁrms (Alchian and
Demsetz (1972)). Moreover, intermediation services require very specialized individual
capabilities that are hard to acquire and to transfer. The acquisition and management of all
the necessary resources (largely immaterial), implies specialized investments and heavy
transaction costs. Transaction costs (Coase (1937)) and specialized investments of human
capital (Williamson (1971)) make standardized contractual agreements too expensive.7
Whenever intermediation goes beyond a very small community, team production be-
comes necessary to dispose of more efﬁcient technologies. Besides, the team production
of a ﬁrm may help to develop the reputation. A ﬁrm is an institution, a set of explicit
and implicit rules allowing different individuals to coordinate their activities. The behav-
ior of the members of the institutions is shaped by these internal cultural rules, and the
institution can thus develop over time a reputation. It is the reputation of its own mem-
bers, because outsiders observe their actions, but it goes beyond the individual members,
because it does not depend exclusively on any one of them, and it survives every one of
them.
Commercial banks develop large networks of branches largely to provide transaction
services. The organized structure of a ﬁrm is particularly useful because banking ﬁrms
can achieve large economies of scale in dealing with the necessary information, while
agency problems arise to a limited extent only. Most of the business can in fact be man-
aged through highly standardized procedures. The network of branches often provides
crucial cost-savings that allow banks to obtain a competitive advantage in the provision of
relationship lending. In the case of lending services, though, agency problems are heavy,
and they increase with the complexity of the organization. The actual lender, the desk of-
ﬁcer, must be granted the necessary freedom to evaluate projects and borrowers, but this
freedom may create incentives to collude with borrowers or to take risks different from
those that the liability holders would like. The problem is that an organization requires
standardized rules and procedures to operate efﬁciently, but these rules must be ﬂexible
enough to allow the desk ofﬁcer (the only person who has the relevant information) to
decide freely (Berger and Udell (2002)). Besides, these rules must provide incentives to
7Even if individual private bankers played a relevant role in the early development of the banking indus-
try.
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between the cost-savings achieved providing multiple services, and the agency costs that
increase with the complexity of the organization.8 Whenever the bank is not just an indi-
vidual ﬁrm, the main problem of the banking ﬁrms is how to keep agency problems under
control.
3 The banking industry
3.1 What’s different about loans
Relationship lending ﬁnanced by means of demand deposits allows large classes of
uninformed agents to ﬁnance risky investment projects through the intermediation of a
bank. When the risk of these investment projects can be evaluated at a low cost with the
available information, these projects can also be ﬁnanced by means of standardized debt
contracts available in the market. In order to understand the role and the function of banks
in a developed economic system it is necessary to explain how ﬁnancial market and banks
complement each other.
Borrowing ﬁrms pay a higher rate on loans than on bonds. The issuance of a loan must
thus imply the furniture of a service that for some reason is worth more than the interest
rate paid on a bond of comparable maturity (Fama (1985)). Bank loans cannot be perfect
substitutes for bonds. They are two different assets because the acquisition of information
is costly, and the future is uncertain. The market can price bonds on the basis of publicly
available information, such as that disclosed on the balance sheet of the issuer. Loans, on
the contrary, are mainly issued to ﬁrms whose business prospects depend on information
that is scarce and opaque. Bonds are liquid, loans are not.
Some ﬁrms -small ﬁrms in particular- do not have access to ﬁnancial markets because
the cost of disclosing the relevant information to enable the market to price the risk is too
large relative to the beneﬁts from getting access to large classes of savers. The diffusion
of information involves both ﬁxed costs and a network-type of externality; the cost of the
disclosure of information that an issuer must assume initially rises as the size of the issue
grows, and eventually begins to decline when a certain size is achieved. A sufﬁciently
large issue is necessary to get access to the bond market; smaller investors need to rely
on personal relationships to obtain credit. The intermediation of a bank allows extending
credit through relationship lending, while beneﬁting from economies of scale in the col-
lection of savings. Banks get access to information regarding the entrepreneurial projects
of the borrower that other market participants cannot get.
Large ﬁrms borrow from banks because the banks’ own credit record provides a signal
tothemarketaboutthereliabilityoftheborrower(Diamond(1991)). Thedisclosureofthe
relevant information normally requires the presence of an intermediary whose reputation
guarantees the reliability of the information revealed. In many circumstances, in fact,
borrowers may face incentives not to report correctly the relevant information. Bank
loans signal the creditworthiness of the borrower. The credit relationship is particularly
valuable even for the bank in the case of large ﬁrms: as they have access to large pools
of savers, banks can proﬁtably act as intermediaries in the placing of bonds of industrial
8For this reason small local banks coexist with large banking corporations.
11ﬁrms, thereby earning fees and commissions. Banks often hold some of the bonds they
place to signal their willingness to share the risk.
Those borrowers who already have a good reputation, a good credit rating and whose
capital largely consists of tangible assets must have another reason to borrow from banks.
The relationship is worth the cost because banks provide insurance against risks that can-
not be hedged in the market. Different types of shocks may, in fact, require new, as yet
unavailable information. When this is the case, the market cannot properly price the risk,
a “lemon” problem emerges, and the bond market dries up (Akerlof (1970)). There are
different examples of shocks that cause these problems. A typical case is a negative de-
mand shock, such as the one that affected suppliers of telecommunications companies in
the late 2001. Another example is the emergence of new information putting in question
the reliability of the accounting ﬁgures of a class of borrowers. Other shocks may affect
the market as a whole, as happened after the collapse of the LTCM, following which no
bond could be placed for more than a month. In any of these cases, companies may ﬁnd
themselves in the impossibility of getting ﬁnance at the moment they need it most because
their liquidity is strained. Commitment loans provide insurance against these shocks. For
this reason large ﬁrms are always willing to pay fees to obtain lines of credit that they
often do not use. Fees and interest rate mark-ups are an insurance premium.
Bonds can be purchased without incurring increasing marginal costs, because even
large intermediaries like banks are price takers. By contrast, the issuance of loans implies
the existence of convex default costs. The reason is that with increases in the quantity of
loans a bank issues, it will end up, sooner or later, ﬁnancing projects with a lower than
average return. Also the analysis of the value of the collateral becomes increasingly dif-
ﬁcult and complex. At the root of the problem lies the fact that the relevant information
ﬁnancial intermediaries can uncover is limited. Thus the returns of investment in infor-
mation gathering must be decreasing. There is only so much knowledge to be found.9
This argument might seem at odds with standard ﬁnancial theory, such as the CAPM, that
suggests that there is a market price for risk, and any agent can buy any amount of risk
at the market price. But it is not. A competitive market for risk only exists for invest-
ment projects on which the right amount of information is available. Loans are issued to
ﬁnance projects whose risk the market cannot efﬁciently price. The information publicly
available is not sufﬁcient to attribute a reliable probability distribution to the outcomes of
the projects: there is Knightian uncertainty (Knight (1921)). The entrepreneurial function
of the banker is to obtain a reliable probability distribution on the outcomes of projects
that the rest of the market cannot price. A fundamental aspect of the task is to evaluate the
borrower’s capability to make the investment proﬁtable. For this purpose the banker must
evaluate the intangible human capital of the borrower and the speciﬁc non-reproducible
resources that he commits to the project. These are not made up exclusively of the bor-
rower’s knowledge, but depend as well on his willingness and capability to use efﬁciently
the different resources given his time constraints.10 Thanks to their particular knowledge,
9Alternatively it ca be assumed that banks have a constant return to scale technology in the monitoring
activity, and that returns are a convex function of the level of monitoring. This is the road followed by
Gorton and Pennacchi (1995).
10“Much of the particular information which any individual possesses can be used only to the extent to
which he himself can use it in his own decisions. Nobody can communicate to another all that he knows,
because much of the information he can make use of he himself will elicit only in the process of making
12bankers obtain a special understanding of both the correlations among the risks of dif-
ferent borrowers and investment projects, and the structural parameters on which risks
depend. They have a superior dynamic perspective of how risks change over time. Risk
parameters are in fact time-varying, and credit transactions require time. This special
knowledge allows banks to diversify risk not only among individual agents and industrial
sectors, but even across time. Banks can thus reduce the risk of the portfolio realizing
a degree of diversiﬁcation that no other agent can achieve. Nevertheless, the beneﬁts of
diversiﬁcation are bounded: any bank is constrained by the available demand for credit.
The degree of diversiﬁcation depends on the existent production structure of the market:
there is a non-diversiﬁable market risk. Even with regard to a whole portfolio of bank
loans, default costs are a convex function of the quantity issued.
3.2 Information and competition in the banking industry
Competition in the banking industry does not produce competitive prices. Banks com-
pete to attract new customers to whom they offer a whole range of services. When dealing
with households, banks beneﬁt from the high search costs necessary to develop a relation-
ship covering a whole range of services. Households need payment services, consumer
credit, mortgages, brokerage services, and ﬁnancial intermediation for the optimal allo-
cation of savings. Since banks beneﬁt from economies of scope in the provision of these
different ﬁnancial products and services, they can attract customers offering better than
average terms on one product to increase the revenues from other. Banks’ real advantage
is that search costs make it normally too expensive for households to hold many different
banking relationships. Intra-industry competition is limited by the ﬁxed costs necessary
to establish branches, and by the long time necessary to develop lasting relationships,
which generate local natural monopolies. Transport costs in fact increase dramatically the
search costs that households must undertake. The other fundamental barrier to entry in
banking is caused by the network externalities in dealing with information, which beneﬁt
well-established banks. On the other hand, banks also suffer from competition from other
types of intermediaries that provide some of the same services, such as insurance compa-
nies or mutual funds. Since recent technological developments have dramatically reduced
the costs to these intermediaries, the market share of banks in the ﬁnancial industry has
markedly declined in most advanced countries in the last decades (Allen and Santomero
(1997)).
The relationship between banks and ﬁrms is of a different nature. Search costs are
much less relevant for ﬁrms, for which it is normally proﬁtable to hold relationships with
many different banks. Competitive pressures are accordingly much stronger than in the
case of households. Banks face both intra-industry and inter-industry competition for the
clientele of ﬁrms. Inter-industry competition is particularly relevant in the case of large
corporations that can get ﬁnance in bonds or stock markets and need banking interme-
plans for action. Such information will be evoked as he works upon the particular task he has undertaken
in the conditions he ﬁnds himself, such as the relative scarcity of various materials to which he has access.
Only thus can the individual ﬁnd out what to look for, and what helps him to do this in the market is the
responses others make to what they ﬁnd in their own environments. The overall problem is not merely to
make use of given knowledge, but to discover as much information as is worth searching for in prevailing
conditions” (Hayek (1988), p. 77).
13diation largely for payment services. Intra-industry competition is stronger than in the
case of households, because ﬁrms can shop cheaply among different banks, so that the
local natural monopoly does not arise. Banks beneﬁt from monopoly power only to the
extent that they act as relationship lenders. Relationship lending, in fact, allows banks to
price monopolistically, because the cost of information generates monopoly power: “Cus-
tomer relationships arise between banks and ﬁrms because, in the process of lending, a
bank learns more than others about it own customers. This information asymmetry allows
lenders to capture some of the rents generated by their older customers” (Sharpe (1990),
abstract). Firms are trapped in the relationship when it is too costly to convey the relevant
information to outsiders. Somewhat paradoxically, competition could in this case gener-
ate an inefﬁcient allocation of capital: competing banks would need to offer better terms
to all customers indiscriminately in order to get a share of the rents because it would be
too costly for them to price the risk of every borrower individually.11 The banking indus-
try can thus be efﬁcient to the extent that individual banks can price discriminate. Two
conditions must be met: ﬁrst, monitoring costs must be too large for outsiders, so that
relationships give banks a sort of natural monopoly over individual customers; secondly,
competitors must not be able to extend credit proﬁtably to their creditors in a standardized
fashion, by pooling the borrowers. Network externalities and economies of scale in the
analysis of information must be overwhelming. This can be the case for investment banks
specialized in ﬁnancing very risky business projects, or local banks focused on small-ﬁrm
lending.
At the limit, relationship lenders might be able to extract the entire surplus generated
by a loan from the borrower. But this would be true exclusively when the lender has the
same information of the borrower on the process, and the investment does not require the
commitment of any speciﬁc resources to the project on part of the borrower. Whenever
the speciﬁc knowledge of the borrower plays a relevant role, he has an incentive to curtail
the effort if the bank can extract the entire surplus. Since banks anticipate this outcome,
the market might collapse. In order to avoid this problem banks must give up part of their
rents. Besides, by the very act of extending credit, banks disclose valuable information.
Thus, they cannot keep their rents indeﬁnitely. Issuing loans, in fact, they signal to the
market that a borrower is reliable and that his investments are expected to be proﬁtable. If
debt contracts extend for more than one period, “banks can correct this incentive problem
by committing to share with other lenders their private information about the quality of
their customers at the end of the ﬁrst period. The resulting competitive pressure forces
them to forgo opportunistic behavior in the second period” (Padilla and Pagano (1997),
p. 207). In this way they can keep the rents for the ﬁrst period, while the disclosure of
information drastically reduce proﬁts in the second period only. The commitment of the
bank to disclose information, though, must be credible. Reputation mechanism are suf-
ﬁcient only when borrowers can cheaply transfer among them the information regarding
the bank, allowing them to avoid banks that are not credibly committed. Otherwise banks
must rely on institutional devices such as credit bureaus, agencies where banks pool the
information.12
11Sharpe (1990) considers this outcome inevitable.
12Institutions of this kind are widely diffused in many countries, in the US in particular (Pagano and
Jappelli (1993)).
143.3 Credit rationing
In the absence of banks, debt contracts could exist, but they would be written directly
by the savers, who often posses no information whatsoever on the investment projects. In
this situation credit would be severely rationed, and most projects could not go forward.
Credit rationing theories normally refer to bank credit, but they are based on very general
arguments that do not take into account any of the speciﬁc characteristics of banks and
bankintermediation.13 Theseproblemsareparticularlyacuteintheabsenceofspecialized
intermediaries.
Credit may be rationed even in the presence of banks, but not to the same extent.
In fact, even if perfectly efﬁcient banks could price every risk individually, credit would
still be rationed. Since the monitoring costs that result under tailor-made lending to the
individual are convex, equilibria with credit rationing may result under this solution as
well. Moreover, perfect price discrimination would require enormous information costs.
Like any other monopolist, a bank must trade off the beneﬁts of investing sufﬁciently to
permit perfect discrimination as against the proﬁts that can be made pooling the customers
and rationing some of them. Nevertheless, banks have a big advantage over the individual
saver: they have far better information about each borrower’s willingness to pay. Still,
the banks must invest in monitoring their borrowers, whose willingness to pay may vary
over time. Banks adopt both strategies - individual monitoring and lumping into classes
- and in equilibrium the two will provide equal net marginal revenues. The monitoring
is only constrained in resources, while the risk-class strategy causes greater problems of
moral hazard and adverse selection too. The more the banking system is efﬁcient in the
analysis of information, the lower the share of assets that will be allocated by means of
standardized contracts.
The entrepreneurial role of banks is to select the investment projects that potential
borrowers are willing to undertake (Schumpeter (1934, 1939)). If banks select borrowers,
some of them must be rationed, even if a well-functioning banking system may enor-
mously increase lending opportunities. Credit rationing cannot be easily reduced by any
short-term policy measure, nor would such a policy be desirable. It is not due to the
inefﬁciency of credit market institutions; it rather measures the potential for further de-
velopment of ﬁnancial intermediation.
4 Concluding remarks: a note on competition and regu-
lation in the banking industry
Central banks have been granted a large amount of discretion in both the conduct of
monetary policy and the regulation of the banking system, in order to allow them to face
unforeseen aggregate shocks. In this cases, in fact, information costs may prevent an
efﬁcient coordination of individual agent’s responses. Besides, each individual’s choices
may produce large external effects on other agents in the market, so that, in the aggregate,
they may systematically under or over-react to the shocks. A centralized authority may
react more quickly and in a more balanced way, working on the basis of the most widely
acceptedmodelsof behaviorofaggregatevariables. Nevertheless, independent authorities
13SeeJaffee and Russell (1976); Stiglitz and Weiss (1981, 1992).
15may act more effectively by adopting transparent procedures and clear objectives, since
when private agents correctly anticipate the behavior of the authorities the cost of the
intervention is much lower.
A fundamental role of the banking system is to provide insurance against unforeseen
shocks, because banks pool liquidity thanks to the network of relationship of trust be-
tween the bank and the customers. Banks, though, not only furnish a reciprocal insurance
service for different agents, but they as well provide a public service of insurance against
economy-wide shocks. The problem lies with the fact that bank managers’ decisions re-
garding the amount of reserves are taken with the aim of maximizing proﬁts, and might
not take account of the public role of bank reserves as a system-wide insurance premium.
Moreover, bankers take these decisions individually, in an uncoordinated way, while they
jointly provide insurance, given the existence of the interbank market. Heavy systemic
shocks, thus, could strain the banking system, since banks often cannot hedge those risks.
When this is the case, an intervention of public authorities is desirable, in order to preserve
the intangible capital represented by the network of relationships. Discretionary powers
in the regulation of the banking system are thus important for a lender of last resort. The
authority to bail out insolvent banks may be necessary to prevent ﬁnancial contagion and
large scale bank runs. This argument, though, does not imply that it is normally desirable
to bail out individual banks.
Banking regulators face a difﬁcult task. They have to bail out when necessary, but
without creating the expectation on part of the liability-holders of other poorly capital-
ized banks that the likelihood of a bailout is high. Bailouts should thus be uncommon
and unpredictable, and this apparently suggests that regulators should not follow any well
deﬁned rule in this instance. But this is not necessarily the case. The regulator’s behavior
should follow rules pushing the market to remove the inefﬁcient management in antici-
pation of an intervention. These rules should thus impose penalties on both management
and shareholders, as in the case of bankruptcy procedures. The standard solution adopted
in the past has rather been to give inspection and intervention powers to the authorities in
order to protect all different classes of liability holders, including shareholders, from any
abuse of the management. The main reason is that agency problems are particularly acute
in the industry, since bankers beneﬁt of very speciﬁc knowledge. As a consequence, mar-
ket mechanisms were not trusted to guarantee neither the efﬁciency, nor the stability of
the system. The problem is that the regulator may not be more informed than the market,
in normal conditions. A proper evaluation of the risk undertaken by all banks would im-
ply a duplication of the information costs of the whole system. Consequently, regulators
can only supervise the policies adopted to price risks by individual banks, and, eventually,
analyze in depth the risk proﬁle of those banks presenting anomalies. Not possessing a
speciﬁc knowledge of the risks of all banks of the system, they cannot price the banks
any better than the market. This suggests that regulators should not protect shareholders,
and, as a consequence, not only they should not, under normal circumstances, bail out
banks, but they should rather force bankruptcy procedures when inspections reveal that
capital is depleted. Regulators should thus, in normal conditions, force bankruptcy proce-
dures, rather than bail out. These procedures, as in the case of Chapter 11, should than be
designed in order to preserve the continuation of the activity, whenever viable.
With the aim of guaranteeing a stable and competitive environment, regulators have
been granted the power to evaluate, and eventually block, mergers among banks, and to
16give selective access to the market, on the basis of information transmitted privately to the
authority. In light of the opaque nature of the knowledge that gives bankers their rents, and
of the relevance of the incentives for the capture of the regulator, it is not surprising that
this solution has never effectively reduced the problems of moral hazard. Competition in
the banking industry, in fact, cannot be increased simply by limiting the market share of
the incumbents. The value of a bank is given by the discounted present value of the sum
of its current and future rents. A division of the rents among different subjects does noth-
ing to reduce them. Competition can be promoted only by creating an environment where
a large number of different institutions can get access to the market. A more promising
strategy would be a continuous development of a regulatory framework that creates mar-
ket incentives for both stability and efﬁciency. In particular, regulation should focus on
promoting the disclosure of relevant information regarding the analysis of the risks under-
taken, in order to allow a proper evaluation of the management. For example, transparent
rules should impose the write-off of bad loans, limiting the discretion in the manager’s
evaluation, or should rigorously forbid the transfer of risks to only apparently unrelated
off-balance sheet entities. Furthermore, given the nature of the rents that characterize the
market, a free-entry policy is essential for the efﬁciency of the system. Unfortunately,
though, most of the regulations put in place in many different countries, apparently in
order to guarantee the stability of the system, seem specially designed to protect the rents
of the incumbents, and the power of bank managers.
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